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ESSAY
REASONABLENESS REVIEW AFTER BOOKER
Nancy J. King*
About a year ago, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Booker1 declared a new standard for the appellate review of
federal sentences-reasonableness. Justice Breyer, writing for
the Court, asserted reassuringly that the reasonableness
standard is not really new at all because judges had been
applying it for years to review sentences for crimes lacking
specific guidelines, sentences imposed after probation revocation,
and, at least until 2003, sentences based upon departures from
the recommended guideline range.2 Like most new legal
standards that take shape case-by-case through the appellate
process, reasonableness review is developing incrementally,
creeping more clearly into view with each passing month. This
Essay offers five observations and suggestions about this
evolving standard.
(1) The importance of separating reasonableness
harmlessness-the substance/procedure divide.

from

An essential feature of reasonableness review is that it is not
the exclusive basis for reviewing sentencing by district judges.
Appellate review remains available for errors in the sentencing

*
Lee S. & Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I
am indebted to Scott Maddock for his indispensable research assistance. This Essay
discusses case law as of December 2005, except as noted. Additional cases applying
reasonableness review are available at Douglas Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy,
http://www.sentencing.typepad.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2006).
1.
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
2.
Id. at 766.
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process, and relief for such error is still governed by Rule 52.'
Whether the length, type, or terms of sentence are "reasonable"
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is a separate question, providing an
additional basis for relief.4 Put differently, reasonableness review
does not replace former standards for reviewing procedural error.
Procedural errors in sentencing include a violation of
Apprendi, Rule 32,6 or another provision of the Sentencing
Reform Act.7 Error may result from a legal blunder in assessing
the applicability or scope of a guideline, including a departure
guideline. A judge may make a clearly erroneous determination
of fact. It would also be a procedural error if a judge assumed the
Guidelines were mandatory or failed to "consider" the Guidelines
at all. Omitting the on-the-record statement explaining the
specific reason for any sentence that is "not of the kind, or is
outside the range [provided in the Guidelines]" as required by
§ 3553(c)(2), is a procedural error as well.8
Regrettably, some judges after Booker have occasionally
blended review of these procedural errors into the review of the
sentence for reasonableness. 9 Take two recurring situations.
Assume a trial judge imposes a sentence she thinks falls outside
the guidelines range, but miscalculates the guidelines range. If a
party appeals the sentence and raises the miscalculation, it is
tempting for the reviewing judges to say, "As long as the ultimate
sentence was reasonable, there's no problem-the defendant

3.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52.
4.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
5.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that a fact, other
than a prior conviction, that increases a sentence beyond the upper guideline limit must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
6.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (detailing proper post-sentencing protocol).
7.
§§ 3551-3742.
8.
§ 3553(c) ("The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the
reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence .. . ."); see also United States v.
Newsom, 428 F.3d 685, 687-88 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that it is error when a court
fails to "resolve [a] disputed material issue of fact that relate[s] to particular § 3553(a)
factors that a defendant brings to the court's attention").
9.
See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir. 2005) (warning that
"selecting the sentence arbitrarily" would require relief because it would not meet the
reasonableness standard); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 114 (2d Cir. 2005)
(dicta) ("[Rieview for 'reasonableness' is not limited to consideration of the length of the
sentence. If a sentencing judge committed a procedural error by selecting a sentence in
violation of applicable law, and that error is not harmless and is properly preserved or
available for review under plain error analysis, the sentence will not be found
reasonable." (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Ingles, 408 F.3d 405, 409 (8th
Cir. 2005) ("[W]hether § 3742 now permits a defendant to appeal on the ground that a
district court error in determining the advisory Guidelines range produced an
unreasonable post-Booker sentence, despite a substantial downward departure, is a
question that seems fraught with uncertainty"-a question the court did not answer.).
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didn't receive a Guidelines sentence anyway."1° Or assume a
sentence outside the guidelines range, imposed after a judge
incorrectly concluded that the departure was authorized by the
Guidelines. One might understand why an appellate judge would
prefer to read Booker's reasonableness review as obviating the
need to review the departure decision under the Guidelines."
Yet, a reading of the statute itself shows that reasonableness
review has not displaced the review of guidelines calculations or
departure authority. The statute no longer mandates relief for
the failure to adhere to the Guidelines, but the Booker Court did
not "excise" the portion of § 3742 that authorizes the appeal of
errors in the calculation of the Guidelines and other violations of
the law.12 Instead, Justice Breyer's opinion states, "[Diespite the
absence of § 3553(b)(1), the Act continues to provide for appeals
from sentencing decisions (irrespective of whether the trial judge
sentences within or outside the Guidelines range in the exercise
of his discretionary power under § 3553(a))." 3 The sections
Justice Breyer cites authorize either party to appeal a sentence
on the basis that the sentence "was imposed in violation of law"
or "as a result
of an incorrect application of the sentencing
4
guidelines."
So rather than skipping over allegedly faulty assumptions or
applications and heading straight to the reasonableness of the
sentence imposed, appellate courts must first sort out the
probability that any error the judge made in calculating the
guidelines range and permissible departures affected the
sentence that was selected. 5 Only if the error was harmless
10.
See, e.g., United States v. Rubenstein, 403 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2005)
(Cardamone, J., concurring) ("[Blecause an incorrectly calculated Guidelines sentence
might nonetheless be reasonable, vacatur of a sentence based on Guidelines errors would
not automatically be warranted.").
11.
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Johnson's
framing of the issue as one about 'departures' has been rendered obsolete by our recent
decisions applying Booker. It is now clear that after Booker what is at stake is the
reasonableness of the sentence, not the correctness of the 'departures' as measured
against pre-Booker decisions that cabined the discretion of sentencing courts to depart
from guidelines that were then mandatory.").
12.
§ 3742(a)-(b).
13.
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 765 (2005).
14.
§ 3742(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
15.
If the party objecting to the error preserved it in the trial court, then the burden
is on the opposing party to demonstrate that the error did not influence the sentence. See
United States v. Von, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002). The Vonn Court noted that Rule 52(a)
provides for "consideration of error raised by a defendant's timely objection, but subject to
an opportunity on the Government's part to carry the burden of showing that any error
was harmless, as having no effect on the defendant's substantial rights." Id.; see also FED.
R. CRIM. P. 52(a). The exact showing required varies depending upon the type of
procedural error claimed. For a constitutional error, the government must show beyond a

328

[43:2

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

reviewing
should the
reasonableness. 116

court

reach

the

question

of

Under Rule 52, procedural errors are not sufficient grounds
for sentencing relief unless they may have influenced the
outcome.17 The question is essentially one of cause and effecthow did the error in the process of determining the sentence
affect the actual sentence imposed? Harmless error review
requires a separate assessment of the influence of each
procedural error on the ultimate sentence. By contrast,
reasonableness review applies only once-to the actual sentence
imposed. s
A sentence that was imposed without procedural error can
be reasonable or unreasonable because reasonableness is
measured in light of nonprocedural factors-those listed under
§ 3553(a). For example, in imposing a non-guidelines sentence, a
judge may have considered nothing unlawful and committed no
procedural error, but simply imposed a sentence too low or too
high to be reasonable."

reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the sentence; but for a nonconstitutional
error, like a violation of the Sentencing Reform Act, the government need only dispel any
"grave doubt" by the judge that the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or
influence'" on the sentence. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437-38 (1995) (quoting
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 776 (1946)). Failure to preserve the
claim in the district court means that the party seeking reliefon appeal bears the burden
of showing the error did make a difference under Rule 52's plain error standards. Vonn,
535 U.S. at 62-63; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
16.
See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 426 F.3d 556, 561 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2005)
(discussing whether the possibility of a different sentence given an appropriate
application of the Guidelines is "remote" under Rule 52).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52.
17.
See United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005) ("We do
18.
not apply the reasonableness standard to each individual decision made during the
sentencing process; rather, we review the final sentence for reasonableness.").
A similar distinction was made in Williams v. United States, where the Court
19.
noted:
[W]hen a district court relies upon an improper ground in departing from the
guideline range, a reviewing court may not affirm a sentence based solely on its
independent assessment that the departure is reasonable under § 3742(f)(2).
Section 3,742(f) specifies two circumstances in which a court of appeals must
remand for resentencing: if the sentence was imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the Guidelines or if the sentence is an unreasonable departure
from the applicable guideline range. The statute does not allow a court to focus
on one remand provision to the exclusion of the other.
[I]n determining whether a remand is required under § 3742()(1), a
court of appeals must decide whether the district court would have imposed the
same sentence had it not relied upon the invalid factor or factors.
503 U.S. 193, 201-03 (1992) (emphasis added).
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Consider a final example. The sentencing process requires a
certain minimum explanation of the sentence, although there
seems to be some disagreement about the scope of this particular
requirement after Booker." A judge's careless or skimpy
explanation might indeed require resentencing, but resentencing
would be required because the party with the burden of proving
or disproving prejudice from the error under Rule 52 (depending
upon whether the error was preserved) is unable to meet that
burden. Resentencing would be required because the failure of
process may have influenced the sentence imposed, not because
the sentence imposed was "unreasonable."' 1
20.
Compare United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005)
(indicating that the trial court need not mention or discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors),
United States v. Sanders, 141 F. App'x 489, 490 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that a sentence
inside the guidelines range is presumed reasonable and that "[t]he defendant can rebut
this presumption only by demonstrating that his or her sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)'" (quoting United States v.
Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005))), and United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470,
472-73 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that a judge "need not rehearse on the record all of the
considerations that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists," but must "explain why (if the sentence lies
outside [the guidelines rangel) this defendant deserves more or less" (emphasis added)),
with United States v. Beck, 157 F. App'x 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing a guidelines
sentence and invalidating an identical alternative sentence using the Guidelines as
advisory (issued in case the Guidelines were held unconstitutional) because the
magistrate judge "did not cite to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), or provide sufficient information
with regard to that sentence to permit a reasonableness review"), and United States v.
Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 304-05 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing probation and home confinement
sentence as unreasonable because the sentence was outside the guidelines range and "did
not include any reference to the applicable Guidelines provisions or further explication of
the reasons for the particular sentence imposed" other than "a list of various
characteristics of the defendant that it considered").
21.
See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2005)
(noting that although a guidelines sentence may be reasonable, the "inadequate
explanation for the sentence precludes [an] affirmance"); United States v. Ayers, 428 F.3d
312, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[In this case we are not certain beyond a reasonable doubt
that the district court, when announcing its alternative sentence, understood its
obligation to consider the factors in § 3553(a)."); United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239,
245-46 (2d Cir. 2005) (clarifying that the failure to explain a sentence as required by
§ 3553(c) constitutes plain error, even when the length of the resulting sentence would
otherwise be reasonable); United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005)
("If the sentence was imposed as the result of an incorrect application of the guidelines,
we will remand for resentencing as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) without reaching
the reasonableness of the resulting sentence in light of § 3553(a)."); United States v.
Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005) ("A misinterpretation of the Guidelines by
a district court 'effectively means that [the district court] has not properly consulted the
Guidelines. ... '" (quoting United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir.
2005))). Consider also United States v. Brady, in which the court held that five years
probation and home confinement, when the Guidelines called for twelve months, should
be remanded due to error in calculation and noted:
The fact that we find the district court's decision to depart in this case does not
conform to the requirements of the Guidelines... would not necessarily render
[defendant's] sentence unreasonable. However, here, we find that due to the
nature and gravity of the court's procedural error-failure to engage in sufficient
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As Judge Carnes has advised, the continued review of
guidelines application on appeal in addition to reasonableness
review does not necessarily mean "pointless reversals and
unnecessary do-overs of sentence proceedings."2 2 If a trial judge
anticipates that a party may appeal some aspect of her guidelines
application, the court can indicate whether a different resolution
would have resulted in the same sentence.23 "[I1f a sentencing
court believes that how it resolves a particular guidelines issue
24
does matter... the court can note that for the record as well."
This distinction between the review of a sentence for
reasonableness and the review of procedural error clarifies why
courts are correct not to have accepted the invitation to adopt, for
the review of sentences, the "reasonableness" standard used by
federal courts to review state decisions under the habeas corpus
statute.5 Under that statute, a federal court must decide whether
a state court's decision was a "reasonable application" of
constitutional law.26 The state court's application could be
wrong-that is, incorrect if reviewed under normal appellate
standards-but within the realm of reasonableness, and thus be
insulated from federal interference.2 7 Adopting the same
approach for the appellate review of sentences would be contrary

fact finding to support departure-and the lack of clear evidence that the district
court would have imposed the same sentence as a non-Guidelines sentence, this
case must be remanded.
417 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Selioutsky,
409 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) ("An error in determining the applicable Guideline range
or the availability of departure authority would be the type of procedural error that could
render a sentence unreasonable under Booker."); United States v. Skoczen, 405 F.3d 537,
549 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[If a district court makes a mistake in calculations under the
Guidelines, its judgment about a reasonable sentence would presumably be affected by
that error and thus.., remand would be required just as before.").
22. United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767, 775 (11th Cir. 2005).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 277 (5th Cir. 2005) (Garza, J.,
concurring) ("[I]n determining whether a sentencing court committed error, courts of
appeals are to 'review sentencing decisions for unreasonableness.' Because our review is
for unreasonableness, it is not enough to say that.., the sentencing court incorrectly
interpreted or applied the Guidelines." (quoting United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738,
767 (2005))); United States v. Creech, 408 F.3d 264, 275 (5th Cir. 2005) (Garza, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In reviewing for reasonableness, we must
remember that 'the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal
law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.'" (quoting Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000))).
26.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
27.
See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 ("[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,
that application must also be unreasonable.").
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to the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that provide for
the appellate review of procedural error, apart from the
reasonableness of the sentence.
(2) Avoid equating reasonableness review with "abuse of
discretion" review as developed under § 3742(e)(3) for
the review of departures-use revocation standard.
As examples of reasonableness review, the Court in Booker
held out three contexts: review of departures, revocation
sentences, and sentences for crimes without a designated
guideline.2 8 In all three, courts of appeals had applied "abuse of
discretion" as the stated standard, 29 but these standards are not
fungible. They are not the same on their face, nor have they been
equivalent as applied. The revocation standard is more
deferential, derived from the statutory phrase "plainly
unreasonable," while the departure standard (at least the
standard that the Court invoked prior to 2003) applied the word
"reasonable. 30
Some judges have opted to use the more familiar review
standard that they have developed for departures,3 1 instead of
looking to revocation cases. 2 This is a mistake. In practice, the
two standards can be quite different. The abuse of discretion
review that courts applied under § 3742(e)(3) before Booker was
appropriate only when a sentence departed from the Guidelines.
As such, it was specifically limited by the Guidelines themselves,
and courts regularly required trial judges to tie their
explanations for departures to specific guidelines factors as

28.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 766.
29.
See, e.g., United States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 2004) (using
abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a revocation sentence); United States v. Cook,
291 F.3d 1297, 1299 n.2, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002) (reviewing a departure from guidelines
under an abuse of discretion standard).
30.
United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 625 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to decide
if there is any difference between plainly unreasonable and reasonable). As Justice
Stevens has noted, Congress specifically changed the standard for reviewing departures
from clearly unreasonable to unreasonable. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 784 n.12.
31.
See, e.g., United States v. Saldana, 427 F.3d 298, 312 (5th Cir. 2005); United
States v. May, 413 F.3d 841, 844-45 (8th Cir. 2005). On the history of departure review
standards, see United States v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting the
appropriate standard for reviewing the basis of a departure is abuse of discretion). See
also United States v. Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397, 415-16 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 489-92 (5th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Selioutsky, 409
F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2005).
32.
United States v. Livingston, 140 F. App'x 886, 889 (11th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Ramirez-Rivera, 241 F.3d 37, 40 n.4 (1st Cir. 2001) (collecting cases on
revocation review).
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analogies, not to § 3553(a). 8 The Court in Booker declared that
the § 3553(a) factors "will guide appellate courts, as they have in
the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable." 4
The problem is appellate courts were not always guided by
§ 3553(a) factors in assessing departures. Instead, they applied a
standard that resembled a "Where's Waldo" game with the
Guidelines manual, looking for some statement, analogy, or
factor that arguably supports or undercuts a departure. This is

33.
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 2003) ("In
determining whether to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court must
determine whether the case falls within the 'heartland' of cases embodying the conduct
contemplated by each guideline. ..." (citations omitted)); United States v. Crouse, 145
F.3d 786, 792 (6th Cir. 1998) ("The extent of any departure must be tied to the structure
of the Guidelines."); United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d 1297, 1309 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The
district court 'may use any "reasonable methodology hitched to the Sentencing Guidelines
to justify the reasonableness of the departure,"' which includes using extrapolation from
or analogy to the Guidelines." (quoting United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 991 (10th
Cir. 1990))); United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313, 317 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Although we have
recognized the impossibility of formulating precise rules for determining whether the
extent of an upward departure is reasonable, this court and others have approved of a
method that involves calculating the defendant's sentence by analogy to existing guideline
provisions. Thus, a district court determines the extent of an upward departure by
comparing the seriousness of the aggravating factors that motivate the departure with
the adjustments in base offense level prescribed by the guideline provisions that apply to
conduct most closely analogous to the defendant's offense conduct. By linking the extent
of the departure to the structure of the Guidelines in this way, a district court avoids the
types of large disparities in sentencing that the Guidelines were designed to prevent, and
gives the appellate court a basis for conducting a principled review of the reasonableness
of the extent of the departure." (citations omitted)). The Supreme Court's most detailed
statement about what this departure review for reasonableness meant can be found in the
1992 case, Williams v. United States:
The reasonableness determination looks to the amount and extent of the
departure in light of the grounds for departing. In assessing reasonableness
under § 3742(f)(2), the Act directs a court of appeals to examine the factors to be
considered in imposing a sentence under the Guidelines, as well as the district
court's stated reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence. A sentence
thus can be "reasonable" even if some of the reasons given by the district court to
justify the departure from the presumptive guideline range are invalid, provided
that the remaining reasons are sufficient to justify the magnitude of the
departure.
Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1992); see also Koon v. United States,
518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).
34. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 766-67 ("The system remaining after excision... retains
other features that help to further these objectives.... The courts of appeals review
sentencing decisions for unreasonableness."). Justice Scalia points this out, stating,
"[a]lthough a 'reasonableness' standard did appear in § 3742(e)(3) until 2003, it never
extended beyond review of deliberate departures from the Guidelines range." Id. at 793
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part). "Deciding whether a departure from a mandatory sentence
(for a reason not taken into account in the Guidelines) is 'unreasonable'. . . differs toto
caelo from determining, in the absence of any mandatory scheme, that a particular
sentence is 'unreasonable.'" Id. at 794 n.9.
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an incomplete and truncated method of reviewing the
reasonableness of sentences imposed after Booker.35
The phrases "abuse of discretion" or "plainly unreasonable"
may be useful ways to describe reasonableness review, but the
content of that standard must not be tied to the Guidelines
themselves. The revocation standard in use before Booker is a
better model for reasonableness review than the departure
review standards.3 6
(3) Use presumptions-rebuttable, not irrebuttable.
The government continues to ask courts to hold that any
sentence within range is per se reasonable. Fortunately, courts
are not going along.37 An irrebuttable presumption that in-range
sentences are reasonable should be rejected, but not because it
"would effectively re-institute mandatory adherence to the
Guidelines."3 8 Finding one set of sentences reasonable does not

35.
Consider as an example the decision by the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Castro-Juarez,425 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2005). There, the court reviewed a sentence of four
years imposed for illegal reentry, which has a ten-year statutory maximum and a
recommended range of twenty-one months. Id. at 431. The court expressly adopted its
pre-Booker departure analysis, which was keyed to the Guidelines, as "a useful starting
point in evaluating the reasonableness" of the post-Booker sentence. Id. at 434. Several
paragraphs of tedious guidelines analysis later, the court concluded,
Accordingly, if this appeal had reached us before Booker, we would have
concluded that [the] sentence is not adequately tied to the structure of the
guidelines.
...All that is necessary now to sustain a sentence above the guideline
range is "an adequate statement of the judge's reasons, consistent with section
3553(a), for thinking the sentence that he has selected is indeed appropriate for
the particular defendant."
Id. at 436 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir.
2005)). Nevertheless, the court went on to find that the district court's general comments
about criminal history, "d[id] not fully explain" the sentence, and found it unreasonable.
Id.
36.
See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 421 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Livingston, 140 F. App'x 886, 889 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Carter, 408 F.3d
852, 854 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 915-16 (8th Cir. 2005);
United States v. McClellan, 164 F.3d 308, 309-10 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Pelensky, 129 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1997).
37.
See, e.g., United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005)
(declining to address the issue of the level of deference due a sentence imposed within
guidelines range, despite the request by the government).
38.
United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United States
v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 n.9 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[We also decline to hold that a sentence
within a proper Guidelines range is per-se reasonable. Such a per-se test is not only
inconsistent with the meaning of 'reasonableness,' but is also inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in Booker, as such a standard 'would effectively re-institute
mandatory adherence to the Guidelines.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Crosby, 397 F.3d at
115)).
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make all other sentences unreasonable.3 9 The problem with
sentences as
rubber stamping all guidelines-compliant
irrebuttably reasonable is rather that it is possible that an inguidelines sentence, free from procedural error, may not be
"reasonable" under § 3553(a) at all.4 °
As the Seventh Circuit explained, § 3553(a)(6) requires the
court to take into account "'the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct."'" It is at least possible
that the application of the Guidelines in an individual case
creates a disparity that is "unwarranted." The Seventh Circuit
seemed to suggest this when it stated that even though "[p] rior to
Booker, disparities resulting from the proper application of the
Guidelines were not a permissible reason for a departure from a
properly calculated sentencing range. .. comparison of sentences
has become a permissible part of the overall sentencing
determination.' 2
This is an issue for sentencing differences created by the
government's decision to seek or withhold a downward departure
for substantial assistance,43 by the absence or presence of an
approved fast-track program, and by the provisions governing

39.
For example, Judge Kennedy, dissenting in Webb, stated,
I question whether a sentence within the Guidelines' range can ever be anything
other than reasonable in light of the Sentencing Commission's congressionally
mandated mission to develop appropriate sentences based on all factors related
to the conviction.
... [I]t
does not follow that a sentence outside the Guidelines' range is perse unreasonable, a necessary prerequisite to making the Guidelines effectively
mandatory.
Webb, 403 F.3d at 386 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40.
United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We have left room
for the possibility that there will be some cases in which a sentence within the Guidelines
range, measured against the factors identified in section 3553(a), stands out as
unreasonable. But those cases ...will be rare."). For one possible example, see United
States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006) (described in note 46 infra).
41.
United States v. Newsom, 428 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6) (2000)).
42.
Id. (emphasis added).
43.
See United States v. Jimenez-Gutierrez, 425 F.3d 1123, 1127 (8th Cir. 2005)
(Colloton, J., concurring) ("It seems to me that there is a substantial question whether a
district court may, in essence, create a 'sentence disparity' by granting a reduction under
the now-advisory guidelines to one defendant based on the provision of substantial
assistance, and then 'reasonably,' within the meaning of United States v. Booker, vary
from the advisory guidelines based solely on this 'disparity' when sentencing another
defendant who declined an opportunity to provide such assistance. Congress clearly
thought it appropriate that defendants who provide substantial assistance should receive
lower sentences than would otherwise be imposed, so it is difficult to conclude that
Congress at the same time believed that such reductions in sentence would cause
'unwarranted sentence disparities' that need to be avoided." (citations omitted)).
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crack cocaine as opposed to powder cocaine." A court need not
find the application of one of these guidelines as inherently
unreasonable in order to find that in a particular case its
application creates unwarranted disparity under § 3553(a),
especially when disparity is considered along with the very first
command in § 3553(a) that a sentence should be no more severe
than necessary (the "parsimony" provision).
Already dozens of trial judges have rejected the
crack/cocaine sentencing recommendations of the Guidelines as
creating unwarranted disparity and are imposing lower
sentences for defendants convicted of involvement with crack." It
is too early to know how these departures and non-guidelines
sentences will fare in the courts of appeals, although it is likely
that at least some of these sentences will be upheld as
reasonable. The issue of whether a guidelines sentence can be
unreasonable will be presented most starkly when a reviewing
court holds that it was unreasonable not to depart.4 6
While an irrebuttable presumption of reasonableness would
be unwise, rebuttable presumptions of reasonableness are useful
and appropriate. One such presumption has been explicitly or
implicitly adopted in most circuits: a sentence that is within the
guidelines range and free from procedural error is presumptively
reasonable. 7 Other, unidirectional presumptions are possible as

44.
See, e.g., Pamela A. MacLean, Cracking the Code: After Booker, Judges Reduce
Crack Cocaine Sentences, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 3, 2005, at 1 (discussing the decreasing
disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentences after Booker).
45.
See United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 304-07 (D.R.I. 2005)
(discussing the district courts' rejection of the advisory guidelines range for crack-related
offenses).
46.
In March of 2006, one court of appeals came close to doing so, but left room for
the district court to impose a within-guidelines sentence. The court reversed a withinguidelines sentence in a methamphetamine case under very unusual circumstances. The
court concluded that in selecting the within-guidelines sentence "the district court did not
adequately consider a number of relevant factors." It remanded the within-guidelines
sentence for one defendant only after first holding that her coconspirator's belowguidelines sentence was unreasonable. The court recognized in remanding both
defendants' cases for resentencing the district judge's legitimate concern in taking into
account a coconspirator's sentence when sentencing another coconspirator. United States
v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006).
47.
See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
sentence within the guidelines range "is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness"); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that a sentence within the guidelines range is presumptively reasonable); United States v.
Gonzalez, 134 F. App'x 595, 598 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that a sentence falling within
the range prescribed by the Guidelines is presumptively reasonable); United States v.
Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) ("If the sentencing judge exercises her discretion
to impose a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness
review we will infer that the judge has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set
forth in the Guidelines."). But see United States v. Spencer, 150 F. App'x 15, 16 (2d Cir.
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well. For example, a court might choose to presume that belowrange sentences are not unreasonably high, requiring unusually
compelling mitigating circumstances before disturbing a belowrange sentence. 48
Presumptions are helpful also because they allow the courts
of appeals to develop guidelines for what showing must be made
in order to rebut those presumptions. Courts may decide, for
example, to invite parties to point out inconsistencies in a judge's
use of a particular reason for departing among defendants in the
same case, something like a prosecutor asked to justify a
peremptory challenge after Miller-El.4 9 Or, a court may decide
that a showing sufficient to overcome the presumption in a case
of slight departure or variance might be insufficient to overcome
the presumption in a case of more significant deviation."
Presumptions could be keyed to numerical multipliers or
percentage deviations, from guidelines ranges, sentence maxima,
or median sentences, on a nationwide or more local basis. It is
not uncommon for reviewing courts to use such presumptions in
reviewing compliance with other standards in criminal casesconsider the statistical showing of underrepresentation that
shifts the burden of production in a jury discrimination claim or
the showing of delay needed to trigger an inquiry into a violation
of the Speedy Trial Clause. Presumptions can bring structure to
what might otherwise appear to be an amorphous, wholly
unpredictable standard.
(4) Scrutinize stipulations as to reasonableness.
A sentence is not reasonable just because the parties say so.
What parties may agree upon as a fair settlement may be quite

2005) (declining the invitation to employ a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness with
respect to sentences falling within accurately calculated guidelines ranges).
48.
Cf United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005) (dicta) ("It is hard
to conceive of below-range sentences that would be unreasonably high."); see also United
States v. Ingles, 408 F.3d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 2005).
49.
See Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 2340 (2005) (reversing a denial of
habeas relief upon finding that the prosecution applied separate reasoning to potential
black and potential white jurors).
50.
See United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426-27 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Sentences
varying from the guidelines range, as this one does, are reasonable so long as the judge
offers appropriate justification under the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). How
compelling that justification must be is proportional to the extent of the difference
between the advisory range and the sentence imposed." (citations omitted)). The Eighth
Circuit has decided in the context of reviewing departures that a 73% reduction for a
substantial assistance departure will trigger a higher burden of justification than a more
modest 40% reduction. United States v. Coyle, 429 F.3d 1192, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 2005).
Something similar might be adopted for reasonableness review.
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far afield from a reasonable sentence when assessed in light of
§ 3553(a). The problem is that parties do not strike deals with the
factors of § 3553(a) in mind. They may have entirely different
goals, different reasons for choosing a certain sentence, which
have never been approved as legitimate reasons to allocate
punishment either by Congress or the Commission."
Reasonableness is defined in part by comparison to other cases.
The parties have little incentive to choose a sentence for
consistency's sake.
For related reasons, trial judges may decide to refuse to
accept plea agreements that contain waivers of reasonableness
review. The wisdom of enforcing appeal waivers generally is a
controversial subject among sentencing practitioners and judges
today, as it has been for at least a decade. In some districts,
virtually all plea agreements include waivers of the review of
sentences; in others, very few do.5" This uneven application of
appellate review has prompted some to call for Congress to
prohibit sentence appeal waivers, a highly unlikely scenario. 3 If
a judge believes the new appellate standard requires
development and consistent enforcement, one option is rejecting
reasonableness waivers.
(5) Give "reas" a chance.
Reasonableness review depends upon more than separating
harmlessness from reasonableness, looking beyond the old
standards for reviewing departure sentences, and developing
useful presumptions. Reasonableness review will require two
resources in short supply: data and patience.
As for data, the Commission recently released some
preliminary information about post-appeal modifications under
the reasonableness standard as part of its report on post-Booker
sentencing." While helpful, the Commission's report describes

51.
See Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of
BargainedPunishment,58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 302 (2005).
52.
See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 33-35, on file with
Houston Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=772884 (discussing the
varying frequency of waivers among jurisdictions).
53.
See Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance From Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV.
175, 177 (2005) ("[C]ongress should ban sentence appeal waivers from plea
agreements....").
54.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.

BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report
BookerReport.pdf (released in March 2006).
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"selected appellate decisions."5 What we have yet to learn is the
percentage of sentences appealed by the defense and the
government that have been vacated as unreasonable, not vacated
due to a procedural flaw. Such statistics will take some time to
gather, but this is just the sort of information that sentencing as
well as reviewing courts need.5 6
Based on this reader's impression, which means little unless
tested empirically, courts seem to be giving real teeth to
reasonableness review. Remands due to unreasonableness are
regular, not rare. Also, even though unusually low sentences
have been upheld, 7 and unusually high sentences reversed, 5 it
appears that courts are more likely to agree with government
allegations of unreasonableness 5 than with allegations of
55.
Id. at 30, exhibit 2.
56.
See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, "The Wisdom We Have Lost" Sentencing
Information and Its Uses, 58 STAN. L. REV. 361, 370 (2005) ("If more judges and attorneys
could see their cases in light of data about the entire system, their influence on the
direction of the sentencing system would be better informed and easier to coordinate.").
57.
See, e.g., United States v. Maese, 146 F. App'x 276, 281 (10th Cir. 2005)
(upholding an eight-level downward departure when the judge stated that the defendant
"was unique among all of the defendants [he] had sentenced in the last ten years" due to
his history of service, making it "an extraordinary case"); United States v. Briceno, 136 F.
App'x 856, 858-59 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding a six-level downward departure based
partially upon the defendant's "family circumstances, his compliance with pretrial
services, and the time since his previous felony" and noting that "[a]lthough these factors
were inappropriate for consideration under the mandatory guidelines, they provide a
justification for a sentence decrease under the now-discretionary guidelines"); United
States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding a probation sentence
when the Guidelines recommended at least twelve months because the district court
explained that the defendant was "'a law abiding citizen, who [did] an incredibly dumb
thing'" (alteration in original)); United States v. Christenson, 403 F.3d 1006, 1007, 1009
(8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 75% downward departure was not unreasonable), affd en
banc, 424 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pizano, 403 F.3d 991, 992, 996 (8th
Cir. 2005) (upholding departure from seventy months to eighteen months as reasonable
when the court "seriously considered the government's recommendation before arriving at
its own evaluation of the significance and usefulness of Pizano's assistance" and "stated
its reasons for departing... were based on its examination of the facts and were related
to the nature, extent and significance of Pizano's assistance").
58.
See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 128 F. App'x 179, 180 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding
an upward departure to the statutory maximum of twelve years as unreasonable for a
defendant who refused to reveal his name when the Presentence Report recommended six
to twelve months).
59.
See, e.g., United States v. Saenz, 428 F.3d 1159, 1160 (8th Cir. 2005) (reversing
sentence of 20 months for cooperation when the statutory minimum was 60 months);
United States v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230, 244 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding the lower court's
downward departure was an abuse of discretion); United States v. Smith, 128 F. App'x 89,
91 (11th Cir. 2005) (vacating as unreasonable a sentence of supervised release and time
served rather than the guidelines range of 78 to 98 months); United States v. Dalton, 404
F.3d 1029, 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a departure from the mandatory
minimum sentence of 240 months to 60 months was unreasonable and stating that "[ain
extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances"); United
States v. Rogers, 400 F.3d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a departure from the
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unreasonableness from defendants." This may have a lot to do
with the careful screening that the government gives all cases
that it appeals. Nevertheless, the courts of appeals seem much
less comfortable overturning upward departures than they do
overturning downward departures.
The Commission's diligent work on post-Booker sentencing
data has provided an excellent picture of what trial judges are
doing with their newly granted discretion under Booker. But we
need to know much more about the rates of reversal for
unreasonableness and the types of sentences considered
unreasonable. Post-Booker sentencings are just now reaching the
appellate courts. Until there is sufficient experience with the
suggested range of 51 to 63 months to probation is unreasonable).
60.
See United States v. Saldana, 427 F.3d 298, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The
sentence does overstate the degree of harm, does not appear to advance the goal of
uniformity, and does over-compensate for the number of counts, but each of these was a
permissible reason for the district court to depart... and, taken together, would likely
justify a sentence at least within striking distance of that imposed by the district court.
Given the deference we owe to the district court .... we decline to hold the degree of the
departure unreasonable."); United States v. Winters, 416 F.3d 856, 857-58, 860-61 (8th
Cir. 2005) (upholding the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years, above the top
guidelines sentence of 191 months, for a first offender convicted of voluntary
manslaughter because of the defendant's "execution style slaying of an unarmed person");
United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 484-85, 491 (5th Cir. 2005) (upholding a statutory
maximum sentence of 120 months, instead of the suggested 41 months, for taking a stolen
car across state lines because the judge found that the sentence did not reflect the
defendant's criminal history); United States v. Shannon, 414 F.3d 921, 922-24 (8th Cir.
2005) (upholding a sentence of nearly five years, rather than one year, for making false
statements to the police in light of the defendant's "extensive criminal history and
incorrigibility," and noting that even if the departure was excessive, it was reasonable
given the factors in § 3553(a)); United States v. Meeker, 411 F.3d 736, 747-48 (6th Cir.
2005) (recommending that on remand the district court should consider imposing a sixlevel upward departure because the defendant's actions caused "financial devastation
accompanied by severe emotional trauma"); United States v. Cunningham, 405 F.3d 497,
500, 505-06 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding a four-level increase (from 135 month maximum to
210 months) for a child pornographer who had engaged in illegal sexual activity with his
victim); United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 814 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming sentence of
eighteen months when the guidelines range was four to ten months because judge
explained that he wanted to give the defendant the maximum benefit of a drug treatment
program); United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 99-101 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a
sentence of two years rather than eleven months for the last of several violations was not
unreasonable); United States v. Yahnke, 395 F.3d 823, 825-26 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding
a two-level departure for a particularly bad criminal history and parole violations); see
also United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming sentence of
forty-six months, when range capped at thirteen months, in part because "[the defendant]
could best receive drug treatment within prison"). Not included in this list is the
horrendous case of the child pornographer who cut off genitals and ate them, where the
upward departure to thirty years was upheld as reasonable. United States v. Rogers, 423
F.3d 823, 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2005). For additional cases, showing the same skewed pattern
(far fewer reversals of above-guideline sentences than of below-guideline sentences), see
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 54, at 30, exhibit 2. See also id., at 35 (stating that
"courts generally appear to [be] reversing below-ranges sentences more often than aboverange sentences").
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actual operation of sentencing as controlled by the courts of
appeals applying reasonableness review, sentencing practices in
the district courts alone may very well present a distorted picture
of how the federal sentencing system is functioning after Booker.

